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NASH IMPLEMENTATION USING 
UNDOMINATED STRATEGIES 
BY THOMAS R. PALFREY AND SANJAY SRIVASTAVA1 
We study the problem of implementing social choice correspondences using the 
concept of undominated Nash equilibrium, i.e. Nash equilibrium in which no one uses a 
weakly dominated strategy. We show that this mild refinement of Nash equilibrium has a 
dramatic impact on the set of implementable correspondences. Our main result is that if 
there are at least three agents in the society, then any correspondence which satisfies the 
usual no veto power condition is implementable unless some agents are completely 
indifferent over all possible outcomes. Many common welfare criteria, such as the Pareto 
correspondence, and several familiar voting rules, such as majority and plurality rules, 
satisfy our conditions. 
This possibility result stands in sharp contrast to the more restrictive findings with 
implementation in either Nash equilibrium or subgame perfect equilibrium. We present 
several examples to illustrate the difference between undominated Nash implementation 
and implementation with alternative solution concepts. 
KEvwoRos: Implementation, decentralization, social choice, equilibrium refinements. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
THE IMPLEMENTATION PROBLEM is to design a game such that a prespecified 
welfare criterion is guaranteed to be achieved by the game across a large 
domain of possible environments. As such, the implementation problem is 
fundamental to economics and its related social science disciplines. The study of 
this problem combines the essential ingredients of game theory, social choice 
theory, and the theory of incentives to rigorously analyze the role institutions 
play in the organization of economic, political, and social activity. Because the 
implementation problem is posed in terms of organizational design, its study has 
implications of an applied nature and is directly relevant to policy problems in 
regulation, negotiation and bargaining, and contract design. Because it lies at 
the juncture of several important theoretical subfields, it also provides insights 
into the logical foundations of basic theoretical constructs such as equilibrium 
concepts and social welfare functions. 
It is therefore important to solve the implementation problem at a general 
level, that is, to characterize the boundaries of organizational design: exactly 
what can be implemented and according to which criteria of rational behavior. 
The least controversial notion of rational behavior is given by dominant 
strategy equilibrium. In such an equilibrium, everyone uses a strategy which is a 
best response to any strategy profile played by others. Clearly, games which 
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possess the property that there exists such an equilibrium across a broad 
domain of preferences have to be extremely special. This intuition is reflected in 
the negative results on dominant strategy implementation (Gibbard (1973), 
Satterthwaite (1975)); Dasgupta, Hammond, and Maskin (1979) provide a sum-
mary of results in this area). 
These negative results led quite naturally to the widespread use of the much 
stronger form of rationality embodied in Nash equilibrium. Nash equilibrium 
requires that each agent use a strategy which is a best response to the specific 
strategies being used by the other agents, which is a form of "strategic 
rationality" not required by dominant strategy equilibrium. Comprehens.ive 
surveys of Nash implementation can be found in Maskin (1986), Postlewaite 
(1986), and Groves and Ledyard (1988). 
Maskin (1977) provides a characterization of Nash implementable social 
choice correspondences (SCCs). He showed that a condition called monotonic-
ity of an SCC was necessary and essentially sufficient for implementation. (See 
also, Repullo (1987), Saijo (1988), and Williams (1984).) Perhaps the most 
important implication of his characterization is that many reasonable welfare 
criteria fail to be implementable because of an indeterminacy or multiple 
equilibrium problem associated with Nash equilibrium. Thus, in contrast to 
dominant strategy equilibrium, the opposite problem arises with Nash equilib-
rium: there are too many equilibria. The key to obtaining positive results in 
Nash implementation theory thus involves mechanism design techniques which 
eliminate undesirable equilibria. 
In a recent paper, Moore and Repullo (1988) have pursued an insight 
exploited by Moulin (1979), Crawford (1979), and Reichelstein (1987) that 
refinements of Nash equilibrium permit the implementation of some additional 
SCCs. They demonstrate that adding the restriction of sequential rationality 
partially alleviates the multiple equilibrium problem and thereby substantially 
expands the set of welfare criteria which can be implemented by carefully 
adding additional "veto" stages to the original game. (Their nearly complete 
characterization of this solution, called Subgame Perfect Implementation, has 
been extended by Abreu and Sen (1990).) They illustrate several applications of 
their result through a series of examples of incentive problems and identify 
welfare criteria which cannot be implemented via Nash equilibria, but which can 
be implemented via subgame perfect equilibria. 
This paper also looks at refinements, but examines normal form refinements 
based on a simple dominance principle rather than exploiting sequential ratio-
nality. The results, perhaps surprisingly, are much stronger. Specifically, we 
make two assumptions about rational individual behavior which combine the 
features of dominant strategy implementation and Nash implementation. The 
first assumption, in the spirit of dominant strategy equilibrium, is completely 
"nonstrategic" and simply says that if, regardless of what actions others might 
be taking, one is never better off taking action A instead of action B and 
sometimes strictly better off taking action B, then action A is not taken. In the 
parlance of game theory, weakly dominated, or "inadmissible" strategies are not 
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used. The second assumption is the familiar best response (Cournot-Nash) 
criterion: given what actions others are taking, one chooses an action which 
does at least as well as any other action. We call this Undominated Nash 
Implementation. The restriction to Nash equilibria consisting only of admissible 
strategies is a very weak normal form refinement. 
We then pose the implementation question relative to these assumptions 
about behavior. What SCC's are consistent with this type of behavior in the 
sense that there exists an institution under which this type of behavior will 
exactly reproduce the social choice correspondence? Our main result is that 
with three or more agents, all social choice correspondences satisfying the usual 
no veto power condition are implementable unless some agents are completely 
indifferent over all possible alternatives. This finding, besides providing an 
equilibrium notion for which the implementation problem with complete infor-
mation is essentially solved, also can be viewed as the natural extension to 
general environments of our earlier paper in which we restricted attention to 
economic environments (Palfrey and Srivastava (1986a)). 
Our results complement the findings of Moore and Repullo in several ways. 
First, what they emphasize is that the addition of extra stages in conjunction 
with additional rationality assumptions (sequential rationality) accomplishes 
more than the familiar method of adding extra strategies in a single stage game. 
What we show in this paper is that if weakly dominated strategies are elimi-
nated, then the addition of extra stages is superfluous. Second, if there are more 
than two players, then any welfare criterion which satisfies no veto power and is 
implementable via subgame perfect equilibrium is also implementable in a 
single-stage game using undominated Nash equilibrium. Third, many welfare 
criteria which are implementable via undominated Nash equilibria are not 
implementable via subgame perfect equilibrium. 
The next section contains the model and a number of important examples of 
welfare criteria which fail to be implementable in Nash equilibrium or subgame 
perfect equilibrium and explain the reasons for these failures. In Section 3, we 
identify a necessary condition for implementation via undominated Nash equi-
librium and also prove that with three or more agents, it is sufficient for 
implementation of welfare criteria which satisfy the usual no veto power 
condition identified by Maskin (1977). For each of the examples of Section 2 we 
provide extremely simple games which successfully implement the desired 
outcomes using undominated Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we mention a 
number of extensions of this result which involve both the relaxation of no veto 
power and the two person implementation problem. Some concluding com-
ments are given in Section 5. 
2. THE MODEL AND SOME EXAMPLES 
2.A. The Model 
There are I agents, indexed by i = 1, 2, ... , I. We denote by A the set of 
alternatives. A state (or an environment), denoted by s, specifies a profile of 
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preferences, one for each agent. S denotes the set of states, and the state is 
assumed to be common knowledge among the agents. In states, the preference 
ordering of agent i is denoted by R;(s), which is a complete, reflexive, and 
transitive binary relation on A. pi(s) denotes the strict preference ordering 
derived from R;(s ). Since states only distinguish preference profiles, we require 
that s i= s' implies R;(s) i= Ri(s') for some i. With this convention, each state 
represents a unique preference profile, and there are no redundant states. 
Preferences over A are assumed to have maximal elements. For agent i in state 
s, we denote such an element by b;(s). 
A Social Choice Correspondence (SCC) is a possibly multivalued mapping F: 
S ----+A. For each state it specifies a set of alternatives. 
A mechanism is a pair (M, g), where M = M 1 X M 2 X · · · X M 1 and g is a 
function g: M -+A. Mi is the message space of agent i, and g is the outcome 
function. Mi serves as the strategy set of i at all s ES. Let M-; = M 1 X M 2 
x ... XMi-lxMi+lx ···M1,with m-iEM-i. 
DEFINITION 1: m; EM; is a best response for i to m-; EM-' at state s if 
g(m-i,mi)Ri(s)g(m-i,mi) for all mi EM;. 
DEFINITION 2: m = (m1, ... , m 1 ) EM is a Nash ·equilibrium at s if for all i, m; 
is a best response tom-; at states. 
If m is a Nash equilibrium of (M, g) at state s, then g(m) is called a Nash 
equilibrium outcome at s. For a given mechanism, (M, g), let NE(s) denote the 
set of all Nash equilibrium outcomes at s. 
DEFINITION 3: F is implemented in Nash equilibrium (by the mechanism 
(M, g )) if for all s, F(s) = NE(s ). 
We turn next to Nash equilibria which do not involve the use of weakly 
dominated strategies. We call such equilibria undominated Nash equilibria (see 
van Damme (1987, p. 27)). 
DEFINITION 4: A Nash equilibrium, m, is weakly dominated at s if there exists 
i and mi E Mi such that 
g(m-i,mi)R;(s)g(m-;,m;) forall m-;EM-; and 
g(m-i, mi)Pi(s)g(m-i, mi) for some m-i EM-i. 
This definition simply states that by playing the alternative strategy m;, agent i 
is never worse off relative to playing m; and he is strictly better off for some 
strategy combination of the other agents. 
DEFINITION 5: m EM is an undominated Nash equilibrium (UNE) at s if m is 
a Nash equilibrium at s which is not weakly dominated at s. 
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Given a mechanism (M, g ), let UNE(s) = {g(m)lm is a UNE at s} denote the 
set of undominated Nash equilibrium outcomes at s. 
DEFINITION 6: F is implemented in undominated Nash equilibrium (by the 
mechanism (M, g )) if for all s, F(s) = UNE(s). 
2.B. Examples 
We turn next to three simple examples which illustrate that a number of 
important SCCs fail to be either Nash implementable or subgame perfect 
implementable. 
For Nash implementation, Maskin (1977) identified monotonicity as a very 
simple and intuitive necessary condition for implementation: 
DEFINITION 7: F is monotonic if for all x s, s' satisfying x E F(s) and 
x $. F(s'), there exist i, y such that xR;(s)y and yP;(s')x. 
Roughly speaking, this says that if x is in the social choice set at s, and the 
strict upper contour set relative to x does not expand for anyone at state s', 
then x must also be in the social choice set at s'. To see why this is a necessary 
condition for Nash implementation is straightforward. Suppose that some game 
implements F, and x E F(s) is an equilibrium outcome at s. Since everything 
preferred to x at s' must also have been preferred to x at s for all agents of the 
game, the Nash equilibrium which generated x as an outcome at s must still be 
an equilibrium at s'. Since by assumption the game implements F, this implies 
that x lies in F(s'). 
In other words monotonicity implies the following. Suppose one wishes to 
construct a mechanism to implement a social choice function for which x is the 
social choice at s, but not at s'. Monotonicity says that in order to do this there 
must exist an alternative y and some individual whose weak preference for x 
over y at s reverses to a strict preference for y over x at s'. Following the 
terminology introduced by Moore and Repullo (1988), we will refer to the pair 
(x, y) as a test pair for the states (s, s'). 
If the domain of F includes a sufficiently large set of possible preference 
profiles and there are at least three possible outcomes, then monotonicity turns 
out to be extremely restrictive, the conclusion being that essentially no single 
valued social choice correspondence (i.e. a social choice function) is Nash 
implementable. With some fairly strong assumptions on the domain, some more 
positive results emerge with respect to multivalued correspondences. For exam-
ple, the ("constrained") Walrasian correspondence is implementable in eco-
nomic environments. However, in more general environments, even apparently 
reasonable correspondences are not Nash implementable. The following exam-
ple shows this for the Pareto correspondence. (This example was pointed out to 
us by Faruk Gui.) 
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EXAMPLE l-Pareto Optimality: There are 3 alternatives, A= {x, y, z}, 2 
states, S = {s, s'}, and 2 agents. Preferences are given by: 
R 1(s) R 1(s') R 2(s) =R2 (s') 
x .xy y 
y z x 
z z 
The Pareto correspondence evaluated at these two states is F(s) = {x, y} and 
F(s') = {y}. Unfortunately, monotonicity requires that x E F(s'), and F is there-
fore not implementable in Nash equilibrium. We remark that the Pareto 
correspondence is monotonic if S is restricted to strict orders on A or if {S, A} 
correspond to neoclassical, pure exchange, economic environments. As a gen-
eral rule, however, the Pareto correspondence is not monotonic. 
EXAMPLE 2-Plurality Rule (from Abreu and Sen (1990)): There are 3 alter-
natives, A= {x, y, z}, 2 states, S = {s, s'}, and 3 agents. Preferences are given by: 
x y z y 
y z y z 
z x x x 
Suppose the welfare criterion picks the alternative which is the first choice of 
the most number of agents, and otherwise uses an arbitrary tiebreaking proce-
dure, say alphabetical order. Then we get F(s) = x and F(s') = y. But mono-
tonicity implies that we must have x E F(s'). 
EXAMPLE 3-Majority Rule and Condorcet Winners: There are 3 alternatives, 
A = {x, y, z}, 2 states, S = {s, s'}, and 5 agents. Preferences are given by: 
x 
y 
z 
y 
z 
x 
z 
y 
x 
x 
yz 
yz 
x 
z 
y 
x 
Define an alternative w to be a ma1onty winner against alternative w' if a 
majority of voters weakly prefer w to w' and more voters strictly prefer w to w' 
than w' to w; w is called a Condorcet winner of A if it is a majority winner 
against every other alternative in A. This example is set up so that there is a 
unique Condorcet winner in each case with F(s) = y, F(s') = z. But monotonic-
ity would require that y E F(s'). 
Many other examples can be constructed using more elaborate combinations 
of majority choice and scoring rules which yield nonmonotonic social choice 
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correspondences in the context of natural (and actually used) performance 
measures (see Palfrey and Srivastava (1986b) for further examples). These 
include virtually any runoff system for determining a winner in a multicandidate 
election when no clear majority winner exists, single and double elimination 
tournaments, the Borda count, and a variety of examples from private good 
economic environments such as those contained in Moore and Repullo (1988). 
In fact the motivation for the extensive analysis of examples in Moore and 
Repullo (1988) is to show how much more powerful subgame perfect implemen-
tation is compared to (unrefined) Nash equilibrium. In the remainder of this 
section, we demonstrate that while refining Nash equilibrium by subgame 
perfection expands the set of implementable allocation rules, there still remains 
a large set of economically important welfare criteria which cannot be imple-
mented. In particular, we show that none of the correspondences illustrated in 
Examples 1-3 are subgame perfect implementable. We then show in the next 
section that all three of them are implementable in undominated Nash equilib-
rium. 
A precise necessary condition for subgame perfect implementation is given by 
Abreu and Sen (1990): 
DEFINITION 8: F satisfies Condition a if there exists B ~A and B ;;;;) range F 
such that for all s and s', if x E F(s) and x $. F(s'), then there exists a finite 
sequence of allocations in B, a0 =x, a1,a2, ••. ,a1,a1+1 and a sequence of 
agents, j(O), j(l), ... , j(l) such that 
(i) akRi<kl(s)ak+l for k=O,l,2, ... ,/-1, 
(ii) a1RiUl( s) a1+ 1 and a1+ 1 piUl( s') a1, 
(iii) ak is not Ri<kl(s') maximal for j(k) in B, 
(iv) j(/) =I= j(l - 1) or I= 0, if a1+ 1 is R;(s') maximal in B for all i =I= j(l). 
This is . a weaker condition than monotonicity since the test pair in (ii), 
(a1, a1+ 1), need not have a1 = x, as would be required for monotonicity. How-
ever, a1 must be indirectly linked with x in a specific way, given by the other 
parts of Condition a. 
This condition can be used to verify that the correspondences in the examples 
are not subgame perfect implementable. Consider Example 1. From part (ii) of 
condition a it must be the case that since x E F(s) but x $. F(s'), there is an 
agent i and a pair of outcomes (b, c) such that bR;(s)c and cP;(s')b. Since this 
is not the case for the SCC used in this example it follows immediately that the 
Pareto correspondence is not subgame perfect implementable. The Condorcet 
correspondence of Example 3 is not subgame perfect implementable for exactly 
the same reason. The SCC in Example 2 violates Condition a since for all 
sequences j(O), ... , j(/) and x = a0 , a 1, a2 , •.• , a 1+ 1, x is Ri<0l(s') maximal for 
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j(O). F is therefore not subgame perfect implementable. Additional examples 
which illustrate different ways in which scoring rules may fail to be subgame 
perfect implementable can be found in Palfrey and Srivastava (1986b). 
3. NECESSARY AND SUFFICIENT CONDITIONS 
This section contains our main results on UNE-implementable SCCs. We will 
show that an extremely weak condition, termed Property Q, is necessary for 
implementation. If there are at least three agents and no veto power holds, then 
it is also sufficient for implementation. 
DEFINITION 9: F satisfies Property Q if for any s, s', if x E F(s) and x $. F(s'), 
then either 
(i) there exists i and a, b EA with aP;(s)b and bR;(s')a and there exist 
c, d EA with cP;(s')d 
or 
(ii) there exists i and a, b EA with aR;(s)b and bP;(s')a. 
This states that if x E F(s) and x $. F(s') then there must exist some agent 
with different preferences between the two states and that this agent cannot be 
completely indifferent between all alternatives at s'. This lack of complete 
indifference at s' need not be stated explicitly in (ii) since the statement 
bP;(s')a implies it. 
It is straightforward to see that Property Q is necessary for undominated 
Nash implementation. If x is a UNE outcome at s and preferences at s' are 
either the same as at s or exhibit complete indifference, then x is also a UNE 
outcome at s', so we must have x E F(s'). Formally we state the following 
theorem. 
THEOREM 1: If Fis UNE implementable, then F satisfies Property Q. 
Observe that Property Q is also a necessary condition for Nash implementa-
tion and for subgame perfect implementation. 
Property Q is an extremely weak condition. To see this, observe that property 
Q is equivalent to Definition 9'. 
DEFINITION 9': F satisfies Property Q if for any s, s', if and only if for all i, 
Ri(s)-=/= Ri(s') implies for all a, b EA, aR;(s')b, then x E F(s) ~x E F(s'). 
This says that if x is an element of F(s) and the only difference between 
preferences at s and s' is that at s' some agents are completely indifferent 
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between all alternatives, then x must also lie in F(s'). Consequently, it is not 
surprising that it is necessary for implementation. What is surprising is that with 
the (usual) additional requirements of three or more agents and no veto power, 
it is sufficient for UNE implementation. We ·now turn to this. 
Recall that the definition of implementation of an SCC has two parts to it. 
The first part requires that every element of the SCC be an equilibrium 
outcome ("truthful implementation"), while the second part requires that every 
equilibrium outcome be an element of F. To implement an SCC, therefore, we 
have to ensure that at s, all elements of F(s) are equilibrium outcomes and that 
nothing outside F(s) ever arises in equilibrium. In the complete information 
environments we are analyzing, the first part is easy to accomplish; the difficulty 
arises in ensuring the second part. For example, suppose x E F(s) but x fl=. F(s'). 
Then, we have to ensure that x is an equilibrium outcome at s but not at s', 
which is impossible if the only preference changes are to complete indifference. 
It is straightfotward to see that (ii) of Condition a implies (ii) of Definition 9 
and that Property Q is strictly weaker than Condition a. It is weaker in two 
ways. First, all linkage between the "test pair" and xis eliminated. Second, the 
test pair is not required to be a switch from a weak preference of a over b at s 
to a strict preference of b over a at s'. A switch of strict preference of a over b 
at s to a weak preference of b over a at s' is also acceptable. 
Returning to the examples given earlier, we now demonstrate the basic 
intuition behind Property Q and illustrate the ideas that are used subsequently 
in the construction of mechanisms to fully implement via UNE. 
We first show how the plurality rule of Example 2 can be implemented by a 
very simple extension of the message space. Here we exploit the fact that the 
test pair does not have to be linked back to x in the way required by Condition 
a. In the implementing mechanism, agents 1 and 2 have two possible messages, 
denoted by (8, {3). Agent three has three possible messages, denoted (8, {3, y ). 
The payoffs are: 
Agent 3 
8 
{3 
Agent 2 plays 8 
Agent 1 
8 
{3 
')' 
Agent 2 plays {3 
The unique undominated Nash equilibrium at s is (8, 8, 8). At s', strategy 8 is 
weakly dominated by strategy y for agent 3, and there are two undominated 
Nash equilibria, (8, {3 , {3) and ({3, {3, y ). Both equilibria yield y. The test pair in 
this example is (z, y ): agent 3 has a strict reversal of preferences between z and 
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y in the two states. Our construction exploits this reversal of preferences which 
permits the addition of a single message that dominates another message in 
state s' but not in s. 
Next we show how the Pareto rule in Example 1 can be implemented via 
UNE. For this example, we exploit the second difference between Property Q 
and Condition a, namely that the reversal in preference in the test pair may go 
from strict preference to indifference. The following game, in which only agents 
1 and 2 play, implements F(s) = {x, y}, F(s') = {y}: 
Agent 1 
8 
{3 
'Y 
Agent 2 
8 {3 
tl 
In state s, the pair (8, 8) and ({3, {3) are both undominated Nash equilibria. 
However, in state s', (8, 8) and (8, {3) are the only undominated Nash equilibria. 
The pair ({3, {3) is not a UNE at s' because 8 weakly dominates {3 for agent 1. 
Using a similar construction, the Condorcet rule in Example 3 can be imple-
mented via UNE even though it is not subgame perfect implementable (see 
Palfrey and Srivastava (1986b)). 
In the above examples, we have shown how easy it is to construct implement-
ing mechanisms using UNE when preferences over the test pair changes either 
from aP;(s)b to bli(s')a (strict preference to indifference) or from aP;(s)b to 
bP;(s')a (strict preference reversal). The more difficult case to solve is a change 
in preference over the test pair from ali(s)b to bP;(s')a (indifference to strict 
preference). The example below shows that for this case, in some instances we 
may have to construct a game with infinite strategy sets for the agents, even 
when there are only a finite set of states. 
EXAMPLE 4-A = {x, y, z, w}, S = {s, s'}, I= 2. Both agents have identical 
preferences in each state, given by: 
R(s) R(s') 
x x 
y y 
z,w z 
w 
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Let F(s) = {x, y}, F(s ') = {x}. Here, y E F(s) and y <t. F(s'). Part (ii) of Defini-
tion 9 is satisfied by agent 1 since wR 1(s)z but zP1(s')w. The following game 
implements F: 
Agent 2 
ao x z z z z z z 
a1 z y w w w w w 
az z y z w w w w 
Agent 1 a3 z y z z w w w 
a4 z y z z z w w 
as z y z z z z w 
There are an infinite number of Nash equilibria to this game at both s and s': 
(a0, a 0) yielding x as the outcome and (ak, a 1) yielding y as the outcome for all 
k ~ 1. At s, none of these equilibria are weakly dominated, since both players 
are indifferent between z and w. At s', however, for all k ~ 1, ak+ 1 weakly 
dominates ak for player 1, since z is strictly preferred to w. The only 
undominated Nash equilibrium at s' is (a0 , a 0 ), yielding x as the unique UNE 
outcome at s'. F is therefore UNE implementable. Note that if this game is 
truncated at any point, say at ak for agent 1, then (ak, a 1) becomes an 
undominated Nash equilibrium at s'. 
The last example illustrates an interesting feature of our construction tech-
nique for eliminating undesirable equilibria in some very special situations. The 
construction technique for these cases uses an infinite chain of dominated 
strategies. This method is closely related to the "integer game" employed first 
by Maskin (1977) to eliminate extraneous Nash equilibria by constructing 
regions of the message space in which players are essentially engaged in a game 
to announce the highest integer. However, as we will see in the proof of 
Theorem 2, this type of construction is often unnecessary. 
The previous examples illustrate how any change in preferences, except a 
change to complete indifference, can be used to eliminate undesired equilibria; 
in all of them, the problem was to eliminate y as an equilibrium outcome at s'. 
The mechanism constructed below to prove sufficiency is a general formulation 
of the intuition behind these examples. The proof also requires the following no 
veto power condition. 
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DEFINITION 10: F satisfies no veto power if for all s, whenever aR;(s)b for all 
b EA and for at least I - 1 agents, a E F(s ). 
No veto power is slightly stronger than unanimity. It says that if at some state 
all agents except possibly one share a most preferred alternative, then this 
alternative must be included in the social choice set at that state. 
THEOREM 2: If F satisfies Property Q and no veto power, and I~ 3, then F is 
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium. 
PROOF: A proof for the general case is given in the Appendix. Here, we 
outline a simple proof for the special case when all preferences are strict and 
there is a uniformly worst element outside the social choice set. That is, there 
exists w EA such that w If:. F(s) for all s and for all i, for all s, aP;(s)w for all 
a =I= w. The intuition behind the construction is quite simple. We want to ensure 
that if s' =I= s is the true state, and x If:. F(s'), then x is not a UNE outcome at s'. 
Since s=l=s', Property Q implies there exist i,ypy2 with y 1P;(s)y 2 and 
y 2 Pi(s')y 1• Call this agent i(s, s') and the two allocations y 1(s, s') and y/s, s'). 
We call i a test agent for the test pair y 1(s, s'), y/s, s'). The mechanism exploits 
this by including a set of (disequilibrium) joint messages at which i may switch 
the outcome from y 1 to y 2 • This is done as follows. First, Mj =AX S XS X 
{ -1, 0, 1, ... , /} is the message space of j. The typical equilibrium joint message 
at swill have m 1 =(x,s,t,O) for all j with xEF(s), where either t=s or 
j=i(s,t). 
The outcome function is constructed so that at s', the situation facing i(s, s') 
is essentially as follows: 
all j =I= i(s, s') 
(x, s, s, 0) (x, s, s', - 1) 
(x, s, s, 0) x y 1(s,s') 
i(s, s') 
(x, s, s', 0) x y/s, s') 
Then, it is not an equilibrium for all agents to report (x, s, s, 0) when the state is 
s'; in particular, (x, s, s', 0) weakly dominates (x, s, s, 0) for the test agent i(s, s'). 
This is how we exploit Property Q. The rest of the construction ensures that this 
type of dominance is preserved at s' for all other messages of the other agents. 
Finally, the integers in the message space ensure that the only possible equilib-
rium outcomes besides the typical ones satisfy no veto power. Formally, let 
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M = M 1 x M 2 x · · · x M 1. To define g, we divide M into a number of regions: 
D 1 = {ml3s ES, x E F(s) such that for all i, either mi= (x, s, s,O) 
or i = i(s, s') and mi= (x, s, s',O)}, 
D 2 = {m ~D 1 13s ES, x E F(s) such that mj = (x, s, s,O) 'r/j * i}, 
D3A = {ml3s ES, x E F(s) with mj = (x, s, s', - 1) for all j * i; 
mi= ( x, s, s, 0) and i = i( s, s')}, 
D38 = {ml3s ES, x E F( s) with mj = ( x, s, s', - 1) for all j * i; 
mi= ( x, s, s', 0) and i = i( s, s')}, 
D4 ={all other m}. 
x if m ED 1 , 
w if m ED 2 , 
g(m) = y 1(s,s') if m ED3A, 
y 2(s, s') if m ED~8 , 
bi'(s*) if m ED4 , 
where i* = 1 +mod1 U::f~ 1 max{O,m~}} ands* =m~·. 
The power of this mechanism lies in regions D3A and D~8 . There, all agents 
other than i(s, s') report (x, s, s', - 1) while i(s, s') reports (x, s, s, 0) and the 
outcome is y/s, s'). If i(s, s') switches his message to (x, s, s', 0), we move to 
D38 and the outcome changes to yz(s, s'). By construction, y 1(s, s')Pi(s)yz(s, s') 
and yz(s, s')Pi(s')y 1(s, s'). The outcome is unaffected by this switch by i else-
where in the message space except possibly to move from D 2 to D 4 • Hence at 
s', mi= (x, s, s, 0) is weakly dominated by mi= (x, s, s', 0). This means that all 
agents reporting (x, s, s, 0) is not an undominated Nash equilibrium at s'. This 
weak domination does not arise at s because y 1(s, s')pi(s)yz(s, s'). 
It is easy to verify that at s, for any x E F(s), mj = (x, s, s, 0) for all j is a 
Nash equilibrium which is not weakly dominated. Also, unless mj = (x, s, s, 0) 
for all j, there is a unilateral deviation which moves the aggregate message to 
D4 and gives some j his best element. Consequently, if there is a Nash 
equilibrium other than mj = (x, s, s, 0) for all j, the outcome must be a best 
element for at least I - 1 agents, and no veto power implies the outcome is in 
F(s). Finally, at s' * s, mj = (x, s, s, O) for all j is not a UNE as argued above. 
Hence this mechanism implements F. Q.E.D. 
This mechanism shares some features of the one used by Moore and Repullo 
to prove subgame perfect implementation, particularly the use of test pairs out 
of equilibrium. However, it differs in several important respects. First, and most 
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obviously, ours is a normal form game, and theirs is an extensive form game. 
Second, the normal form representation of their game is not equivalent to the 
one here. One major difference is that they require a (possibly very long) 
sequence of test pairs of allocations involving different individuals and different 
alternatives and must impose strong restrictions on the relationships between 
test pairs along such a sequence. While we concede that the use of predesig-
nated test pairs at all seems a bit artificial, the use of a long predesignated 
sequence of such pairs is even more so. 
The third, and perhaps most telling difference, is that our construction uses 
only a single stage of simultaneous play as opposed to many stages of simultane-
ous play. Consequently, we do not need to impose the additional restriction of 
sequential rationality in our equilibrium concept. In fact, the proofs for sub-
game perfect implementation rely heavily on the ability of each player to predict 
with perfect accuracy what the other players will do off the equilibrium path. 
Since there are multiple equilibria in some subgames of those mechanisms, this 
is a strong rationality requirement. 
4. EXTENSIONS 
In this section, we consider extensions of Theorem 2. Our first extension deals 
with relaxing the no veto power condition. While no veto power is a very weak 
restriction (for example, it is vacuously satisfied in pure exchange economies), it 
can sometimes impose undesirable restrictions on a welfare criterion. This is 
illustrated by the following example, which shows that no veto power can be 
inconsistent with Pareto optimality, and also that it is not necessary for UNE 
implementation. 
EXAMPLE 5-No Veto Power and Pareto Optimality: There are 3 alternatives, 
A= {x, y, z}, 2 states, S = {s, s'}, and 3 agents. Preferences are given by: 
R 1(s) R 1(s') R 2(s) = R 2(s') = R 3(s) = R 3(s') 
x x,y x,y 
y z z 
z 
The Pareto optimal SCC for this example is given by F(s) = {x}, F(s') = {x, y}. 
No veto power requires that y E F(s), so that F does not satisfy the require-
ments of Theorem 2. However, F is implemented in undominated Nash 
equilibrium by the following trivial game: 
Agent 1 {3 EB 
At s, a is the unique undominated Nash equilibrium yielding x as the 
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equilibrium outcome while at s', both a and f3 are undominated Nash equilibria 
yielding x and y as UNE outcomes. 
The following assumptions, which are weaker than no veto power, apply to 
situations similar to the one above. Let B;(s) and W;(s) denote the sets of best 
and worst elements for agent i at state s. 
WEAK NVP: For alls, s', for all i, W;(s) n [n j,.;Bj(s')] cF(s'). 
UNANIMITY: For alls, n jBj(s) c F(s ). 
Weak NVP says that if a worst element for i at s is a best element at s' for all 
j -=Fi, then this element lies in F(s'). Unanimity says that any unanimously best 
element at s must also lie in F(s). Together, these assumption are weaker than 
no veto power. 
THEOREM 3: If F satisfies Property Q, Unanimity, Weak NVP, and I~ 3, then 
F is implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium. 
PRooF: Same as that of Theorem 2 with the exception of Lemma 3 (in the 
Appendix). In Lemma 3, weak NVP yields that if there is an equilibrium at s in 
D~ for some i, the outcome lies in F(s). Unanimity yields that if there is an 
equilibrium at sin DAA to D 10 , then the outcome lies in F(s). Q.E.D. 
Theorem 3 implies that with strict preferences, the Pareto correspondence is 
implementable, as is any selection from the Pareto correspondence which 
preserves weak NVP. Further, several voting rules including majority and 
plurality rules satisfy the hypotheses of Theorem 3. 
We turn next to the case of two agents . . In this case, we show that the 
additional domain assumption that there exists a unanimously undesirable 
alternative suffices for implementation. That is, then{ is an alternative which is 
ranked strictly last on all preference orders in the domain. Such an assumption 
has been used by McKelvey (1989) to obtain strategy space reductions for Nash 
implementation and was also used to illustrate the proof of Theorem 2 in this 
paper. A slightly weaker assumption is used by Moore and Repullo (1988) for 
subgame perfect implementation in the 2-agent case. We also show that with 
this assumption, no veto power can be replaced with unanimity, and the 
requirement of three or more agents can be dispensed with. 
AssuMPTION H: There exists w EA such that for all i, for alls, aP;(s) w for all 
a EA\ {w}, and w $. F(s) for alls. 
THEOREM 4: If F satisfies Property Q, Unanimity, H, and I~ 2, then F is 
implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium. 
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PROOF: If I> 2, then Theorem 3 applies. If I = 2, we modify the mechanism 
used in the proof of Theorem 2. Note first that with I= 2, D~ and D~ may have 
a nonempty intersection. We let g(m) = w if m ED~ for any i. Second, since 
x E F(s) is never a worst element for any i and s, we let the outcome in D~A 
and D~s be determined as in D 10 • It can now be checked that Lemmas 1, 2, 3, 
and 5 (in the Appendix) still hold. In Lemma 4, m ED~ is never an equilibrium 
outcome at any s since either agent can unilaterally move m to D 1 U D 2 and get 
xP;(s)w. Finally, unanimity ensures that if m is an equilibrium at s in DJA to 
D 10 , g(m) E F(s). Q.E.D. 
5. DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Our results show that in general collective choice problems, virtually all 
welfare criteria are implementable in undominated Nash equilibrium. In this 
section we comment on some features of our analysis. 
Undominated Nash equilibrium is a refinement of the Nash equilibrium 
concept which is weaker than Selten's (1975) notion of a trembling-hand perfect 
equilibrium (see van Damme (1987, p. 28) for a discussion of this point). One 
advantage of UNE over perfection is that it is easy to define for infinite games, 
while extensions of perfect equilibrium to infinite games can lead to weakly 
dominated strategies being played in equilibrium. In our setting, it is natural to 
work with infinite games. If the set of alternatives, A, is infinite (as would be the 
case, for example, if A was the set of feasible allocations in a pure exchange 
economy), then the set of preferences over A is also infinite, and any game 
which involves elicitation of preferences will naturally involve an infinite strat-
egy space. In this sense, UNE seems a more natural concept of equilibrium for 
our setting than is perfection. It should also be noted that in the characteriza-
tion of perfect equilibrium in terms of lexicographic Nash equilibrium (see 
Brandenburger and Dekel (1986), Blume (1986)), perfection requires strong 
assumptions on "higher order" beliefs while the relaxation of these assumptions 
yields undominated Nash equilibrium. 
Our next comment concerns the size of the mechanism we construct in our 
sufficiency proof. The mechanism for the general case may appear to be 
unintuitive and complicated. These complications are due to the fact that we 
constructed a single mechanism to implement any sec satisfying our conditions. 
Consequently, we were not able to use information which might be specific to a 
given problem. For example, the mechanism constructed in Palfrey and Srivas-
tava (1986a) for pure exchange economies is much simpler than the one 
constructed here, but exploits several important features of the pure exchange 
model. The mechanism for strict preference domains given in Section 3 is also 
quite simple. Further, as the examples in Section 3 show, in many cases 
implementing mechanisms may be nearly as simple as "direct" mechanisms. 
However, the mechanisms used for the general constructive proofs in virtually 
all of implementation theory tend to be cumbersome and artificial. In our case, 
This content downloaded from 131.215.23.115 on Mon, 07 Mar 2016 22:57:24 UTC
All use subject to JSTOR Terms and Conditions
UNDOMINATED NASH IMPLEMENTATION 495 
while eliminating weakly dominated strategies turns out to be a very powerful 
tool, the way in which this power is exploited raises some deep issues. 
First, there is the issue of whether the rationality requirement that players do 
not use dominated strategies is a weak assumption or a strong assumption. Is a 
single round of elimination of dominated strategies a reasonable refinement 
criterion? If so, then it is important to characterize precisely what can be 
implemented and to give an indication of how to design mechanisms to do so. 
Our opinion on this is that compared with the strength of the mutual best 
response criterion of Nash equilibrium and compared with any other refinement of 
Nash equilibrium, eliminating one round of dominated strategies is a very weak 
assumption. This view is supported by recent work by game theorists on the 
rational foundations of noncooperative play (see, for example, Dekel and 
Fudenburg (1987)). It is, by most criteria, one of the weakest possible refine-
ments of Nash equilibrium (van Damme (1987, p. 314, Figure 1)). 
Second is the question of whether it is an appropriate criterion to apply if 
there are an infinite number of strategies. Here, we take the view that the kind 
of problems that may arise with respect to infinite strategy spaces are problems 
of a more fundamental sort that also challenge the use of the Nash equilibrium 
concept and most other refinements. For one thing, the rationality arguments 
cited above do not depend on there being a finite number of strategies. 
Potentially more problematic is that the undominated best response correspon-
dence can be empty in infinite games. Of course, this can also happen with the 
best response correspondence, which can be empty when there are an infinite 
number of strategies, but for different reasons. Examples of this in economic 
applications abound, including spatial location games in which the "best re-
sponse" is to move as close to one's opponent as possible, or games of timing 
where one would like to move immediately before (or after) one's opponent, or 
in bidding and pricing games, where one would like to bid slightly higher (or 
lower) than one's opponent. But the nonexistence of best responses off the 
equilibrium path does not necessarily negate the value of applying the criterion 
of a mutual best response (Nash) equilibrium when one exists. Similarly, the 
nonexistence of undominated best responses off the equilibrium path need not 
negate the value of applying the criterion of undominated mutual best response 
(Nash) equilibrium when one exists. 
Third is the question of whether it is appropriate to exploit an infinite chain 
of dominated strategies for purposes of mechanism design. In particular, our 
general proof (though not the proof with strict preferences under Assumption 
H) has an infinite chain of dominated strategies. This is a more difficult issue to 
answer, and we are not sure there is a good answer for the time being. Our 
tentative answer is that we are uncomfortable with this, in much the same way 
we are uncomfortable with the use of integer games and other artificial features 
found almost universally in the constructive proofs of implementation theorems. 
We must bear in mind that these are primarily existence theorems (including 
the ones in this paper), and that the first step towards proving an existence 
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theorem is finding a correct proof. Once existence of such mechanisms has been 
established, we can go on to study properties of these mechanisms. Under 
exactly what circumstances are infinite chains of dominated strategies required? 
Do "real world" mechanisms have features which are similar to features of 
these apparently abstract mechanisms? These and related questions are impor-
tant subjects of future research, but are not the main focus of the present paper. 
One interpretation of our results is that they provide a general possibility 
theorem and show that noncooperative behavior is consistent with an extremely 
large class of welfare criteria. Since part of the motivation for our analysis was 
that previously studied equilibrium notions were unable to implement several 
important welfare criteria, this is a strong positive result insofar as UNE allows 
us to implement most SCC's. The constructive proof provides one method for 
applying these general results to specific problems of mechanism design. One 
obvious direction to take this research is to investigate the existence of simple 
"realistic" mechanisms in specific applications. 
Finally, we note that we have limited the analysis to situations of com-
plete information. Jackson (1991), Palfrey and Srivastava (1987, 1989a), and 
Postlewaite and Schmeidler (1986), and others, provide a characterization of 
Bayesian implementable SCC's in settings of incomplete information, while a 
general characterization of undominated Bayesian implementable allocations is 
given in Palfrey and Srivastava (1989b). 
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APPENDIX 
We prove the theorem first for the special case in which in each state, each agent has a worst 
element. At the end, we show how the proof changes when this is relaxed. For each i, let 
wi(s) E W'(s) = {xfzR'(s)x for all z EA}. 
For any s and s', if (i) of Definition 9 holds, define i1(s, s'), y 1(s, s'), and yz(s, s') to be an agent 
and a pair of alternatives such that y 1P'(s)y 2 and y 2 R;(s')y 1. If (ii) but not (i) of Definition 9 holds, 
define i2(s, s'), z 1(s, s'), and z 2(s, s') to be an agent and a pair of alternatives such that z 1R'(s)z2 
and z 2 P'(s')z 1. Let 
where 
M{ = {(x,s)fx EF(s), s ES}, 
M) = {-4, -3, -2, -1,0, 1,2,. .. }, MJ = {O, 1,2,. .. }, 
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We partition M as follows. 
D1 = {mlm1 = (x,s,s,0,0,s) Vj} , 
D2 = { mlVj, m1 = (x, s, s,0,0, s), or mj = (x , s , s', - 1, kj, sj ) and j = i1(s, s'), 
1 
- ( ' - 3 kj j) d . - . ( ') · D } orm - x,s , s , , ,s an J t 2 s,s , m~ 1 , 
D i - { 1\.,1. • j - ( 0 0 ) j - ( ' - 1 kj j) d . - . ( ') 3 - m1vJ=F1,m- x,s,s,, ,s ,orm- x, s,s , , ,s an 1-11 s,s, 
D~A = { mJ'Vj =I= i, m1 = (x , s, s", - 2, 0, s ); i = i 1(s, s"); m' = (x, s , s, 0, 0, s ), 
or mi= ( x, s, s', - 3, ki , s i) and i = i 2 (s, s')} , 
D~A = {mlVj 'h , m j = (x, s, s", - 2, kj, s) ; max k j > O; i = i1(s, s"); 
] >Fl 
mi= ( x, s, s,O, 0, s), or m' = ( x, s, s' , - 3, k', s') and i = i2( s, s ' ) } • 
D6A = { mfVj * i, m' = (x , s, s', - 2, 0, s ) ; mi = (x , s, s', - 1, k,., s') ; i = i 1( s, s')}, 
D I -{ n..t· . l -( " 2 kj )"-'( ")· '-( ' 1 k' i ) 7A- m1vJ=Fl , m - x ,s,s ,- , ,s ,i-11 s, s ,m - x,s,s , - , ,s 
D I - { 1\.,1 ' ' j - ( " 2 kl ) " _,_ • ( ")• i - ( 0 0 ) BA- m1vJ=l= l , m - x,s,s ,- , ,s , z ..,....z 1 s,s , m - x,s,s, , ,s, 
or mi = ( x, s, s', - 1, ki, s') and i = i1(s, s') , 
or m' = ( x, s,s' , -3 , k 1 ,s1 ) and i =i2(s,s')}. 
Regions D~8 to D llB are defined analogously to regions D4A to D~A except that - 1 is replaced by 
-3, -2 by -4, -3 by -1, i1 by i 2, and i2 by i1. 
D9A = { ml\fj =I= i , m j = ( x, s, s, i , 0, s ) ; m' = ( x, s, s, 0, 0, s ), or mi= ( x , s , s', - 1, k ' , si) 
and i = i1(s , s ') or mi= (x' s , s', - 3, e, si) and i = i2(s, s')} , 
For m E D 10, let 
/* = { ilmax {O, m3} ;;. max { 0, m~} for all j} 
and i* =min; E 1• {i}. For iz(s, s"), let 
z*(si,s,s") = { z 1(s,s") 
z2(s, s") 
if z 1( s,s")R;(s;)z2(s,s"), 
otherwise, 
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g(m) = 
x 
wi(s) 
y 1(s,s") 
wi(s") 
yz(s,s') 
bi(/) 
z 1(s, s") 
z2 (s,s') 
z*(si, s, s 11 ) 
z 1(s,s 11 ) 
bi(s) 
bi'(m',;) 
if m ED 1 UD 2 , 
if m ED) u D98 , 
if m ED4A, 
if m E DsA u D8n. 
if m ED~A• 
if m E D7A and ki >max kj, 
}*-i 
if m E D7A and ki,;:; max kj, 
j=Fi 
if m E D8A and m] = -1 and ki >max kj, 
j-=l=i 
if m E D8A and m] * - I or ki,;:; max kj, 
j-=1-i 
if m E D48 U D58 , 
if m ED!,8 , 
if m E D78 and ki > max k 1, 
j-:1-i 
if m E D78 and k',;:; max kj, 
j-=l=i 
if m E D9A, 
if m E D 10 . 
LEMMA 1: x E F(s) implies m 1 = (x, s, s,0, 0, s) for all j is a Nash equilibrium at s. 
PROOF: Any unilateral deviation by i moves the joint message from D 1 to either D 2 or D3. In 
either case, i is no better off. Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 2: x E F(s) implies mj = (x, s, s, 0, 0, s) for all j is not weakly dominated at s. 
PROOF: Consider any i. There are three types of deviations i can make: 
(i) mi=(x,s,s',-1,k',si) where i=i,(s,s') forsomes', 
(ii) m'=(x,s,s',-3,k',s') where i=iz(s,s') forsomes', 
(iii) any other deviation. 
Case (i): Consider mj = (x, s, s', - 2, 0, s) '</j * i. Then, (m-', mi) E D4A while (m-i, ;ni) E DfiA, 
so g(;n-i, mi)= y 1(s, s') and g(m-i, ;ni) = yz(s, s'). Since y 1Pi(s)y 2 , i is strictly worse off using mi. 
Case (ii): First note that if (x, s, s', - 3, ki, si) weakly dominates mi at s, then so does (x, s, s', 
-3, ki, s), because the last element of i's message is only used in D?8 to determine z* and in D 10 
to determine i's best element when i = i*. Therefore, let m' = (x, s, s', - 3, k', s). For any ;n-', 
consider g(;n-i, mi) and g(;n-i, ;ni), and observe that the outcome is only affected when (m-i, mi) 
E D48 u D58 . If m 1 = (x, s, s", - 4, 0, s) '<Jj * i and i = iz(s, s") and s" * s', the outcome can change 
from z 1(s, s") in D48 to either z*(s, s, s") or z 1(s, s") in D?8 . By definition of z 1(s, s") and zz(s, s"), 
z 1Ri(s)z2 , so z*(s, s, s") = z 1(s, s"), and the outcome therefore does not change. If mj = (x, s, s', 
-4,0,s) '<Jj*i, (m-i,mi)ED4 8 and (m-i,mi)EDfi8 so the outcome changes from z 1(s,s') to 
zz(s, s'). However, z 1(s, s')Ri(s)z2(s, s') soi is no better off. If(;n-i, mi) E D5 8 , then (m-', mi) E D78 
and the outcome is either z*(s,s,s") or z 1(s,s") in D?8 . Again, since z*(s,s,s")=z 1(s,s"), the 
outcome does not change. Hence, ;ni does not weakly dominate mi. 
Case (iii): Any other deviation by i moves the joint message from D 1 to D3. There are two cases: 
xPi(s)wi(s) and wi(s)Ri(s)x. If xPi(s)wi(s), then i is strictly worse off by switching from mi. If 
wi(s)Ri(s)x, so that x is a worst element for i at s, consider mj = (x, s, s, i, 0, s) '<Jj * i. Then, 
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(m - •, m') E D~A while (m - •, m') E D~18 , and the outcome changes from b'(s) to w'(s). If 
b'(s)P'(s)w'(s), then i is strictly worse off by switching from m'. If w'(s)R'(s)b'(s), then i is 
completely indifferent between all alternatives at s so m ' is not weakly dominated by any strategy. 
Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 3: At any s, if mis a UNE and m r1.· D 1 U Dz, then g(m) E F(s). 
PROOF: Outside of D 1 u D z, there are always at least I - 1 agents each of whom can unilaterally 
move the joint message to D 10 and obtain their best element at s. Hence, if m is a Nash equilibrium 
and m fl. D1 U Dz, it must be the case that g(m)R'(s)b'(s) for at least I - 1 agents. No veto power 
then yields g(m) E F(s). Since UNE(s) c NE(s), the conclusion follows. Q.E.D. 
LEMMA 4: If m E D 1 is a UNE at s', then g(m) E F(s'). 
PROOF: Let m 1 = (x ,s, s,0,0,s) 'rlj. Ifs' =s, then since M1 = {(x, s)lx EF(s)}, we trivially have 
x E F(s), so suppose s * s' and x fl. F(s'). Then either (i) or (ii) of Definition 9 holds. 
Suppose (i) holds. We claim that m' = (x, s, s', - 1, 2, s') weakly dominates m ' for agent i 1(s, s'), a 
contradiction. To see this, observe that the change from m' to m' only affects the outcome when (m - •, m') E D4A U D5A U D8A' We analyze each case separately. 
(1) If (m - •, m') E DJA, (m - •, m') E D(, A u D?A' The outcome changes from y1(s, s ") in D4A to 
b'(s') in D?A (since k ' = 0 'rlj * i) or from y 1(s, s') to Yz(s, s') in D(,A' By definition, 
b'(s')R'(s')yi(s, s") and YzR'(s')y 1• 
(2) If (m - •, m') E D5A, (m- i, m') E D?A, and the outcome changes from w'(s") to b'(s') if 
k' > max1 ,,. , k 1 and remains at w'(s") otherwise. When s" = s' and kj = 1 'r/j * i, i is strictly better 
off since by definition of i 1(s, s '), b'(s')P'(s')w'(s'). 
(3) (m - ',m')ED8A =(m-',m')EDsA' The outcome either remains at w'(s") or changes to 
b'(s'). In either case, i is no worse off. 
Suppose (ii) holds. We claim that m' = (x, s, s', - 3, 2, s ') weakly dominates m for agent iz{s, s'). 
To see this, observe that the change from m' to m' only affects the outcome when (m - •, m') E D48 
U D58 . We analyze each case separately. 
(1) If (m - •, m') E D4s, (m - •, m') E D(,B u D~B· When (m - •, mi) E D(,B, then the outcome changes 
from z 1( s, s') in D48 to Zz(s, s') in D(,8 , and i is strictly better off since by definition, ZzP'(s')z 1. If 
(m - ',m') E D?8 , the outcome either changes from z 1(s,s") to z*(s', s,s") or remains z 1(s,s"). In 
either case, i is no worse off. 
(2) If (m - ',m')ED58 , (m - ',m')ED'78 , and the outcome either changes from z 1(s,s") to 
z*(s', s, s") or remains at zi(s, s"). In either case, i is no worse off. Q.E.D. 
L EMMA 5: If m E Dz is a UNE at s' with m{ = (x, s) 'rlj, then x E F(s'). 
PRooF: As in Lemma 4, we may suppose that s' * s and x fl. F(s'). Then either (i) or (ii) of 
Definition 9 hold. In either case, we derive a contradiction. 
If (i) holds, consider agent i = i 1(s, s'): 
(a) If i is playing m' = (x, s, s, 0, 0, s), then the same argument as in Lemma 4 can be used to 
show that m' is weakly dominated. 
(b) If i is playing m' = (x, s, s'', - 1, k', s'), then m' = (x , s, s", - 1, k ' + 1, s') weakly dominates 
m'. To see this, note that the change from m' tom' only affects the outcome in D~A and in D~A' In 
D?A, when m 1 = (x, s, s', - 2, k', s) 'rlj * i, the outcome changes from w'(s') to b'(s'), and i is strictly 
better off. For any other m 1, j * i, such that (m- •, m ' ) E D~A, i is no worse off. If (m- •, mi) E D~A, 
the outcome can change from w'(s") to b'(s') or remain the same. In either case, i is no worse off. 
Hence g(m - ',m')R'(s')g(m - i, m') 'rim - • and g(m - i,mi)P'(s')g(m - •, m i) when m 1 = (x,s,s', 
-2, ki, s) 'rlj * i, so that m' weakly dominates m'. 
(c) If i is playing m' = ( x, s, s'', - 1, k', si) for s' * s', then changing from si to s' never hurts i , so 
m' given in (b) weakly dominates m'. 
(d) If i is playing mi = (x, s, s", - 3, k ', s'), we claim that if zz(s, s)P'(s')z1(s, s) for some s such 
that i = i 2(s, s), then m' = (x , s, s", - 3, k' + 1, s ') weakly dominates m i. To see this, note that the 
change from m' to m' only affects the outcome in D'78 • When mj = (x, s, s, - 4, k ', s) 'r/j * i , the 
outcome switches from z 1(s, s) to z*(s', s, s) = z 1(s, s) since z z{s, s)P'(s')z 1(s, s ), and i is strictly 
better off. Further, i is no worse off for any m-• such that (m - i, m') E D~8 . 
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Suppose, then, that z 1(s, s)R'(s')zz(s, s) for all s such that i = iz(s, s). In this case, z*(s', s, s) = 
z 1(s, S) for all such s, and we claim m' = (x, s, s', - 1, 2, s') weakly dominates m'. To see this, 
observe that the outcome can only change in D4A> D5A, D6s, D?s, or DsA- If (m-•, m') E D5A, 
then (m-•, ;n-i) E D?A· When mj = (x, s, s', - 2, 1, s) Vj * i, the outcome changes from w'(s') to 
b;(s') and i is strictly better off. For any other m _, such that (m -•, m') E D?A> i is no worse off. 
Elsewhere, it is easy to see that i is no worse off so ;ni weakly dominates m' (see Palfrey and 
Srivastava (1986b) for details). 
(e) If i is playing m; = (x, s, s", - 3, ki, si), s' * s', then changing from s' to s' never hurts i at s', 
and the arguments in (d) apply. 
To summarize (a)-(e), if (i) of Definition 9 holds, then m' is weakly dominated. Suppose then 
that (ii) of Definition 9 holds, and consider agent i = iz(s, s'). 
(f) If i is playing m' = (x, s, s", - 3, k', s'), then m' = (x, s, s", - 3, k' + 2, s') weakly dominates 
m'. To see this, note that the outcome can only change in D?s· Since zz(s, s')Pi(s')z1(s, s'), 
z*(s', s, s') = zz(s, s'), so when mj = (x, s, s', - 4, k' + 1, s), the outcome changes from z 1(s, s') to 
z*(s', s, s') and i is strictly better off. For any ;n-• such that (m-•, m') E D?s, i is no worse off. 
(g) If i is playing m; = (x, s, s", - 1, k', si), then m' = (x, s, s", - 1, k' + 2, s') weakly dominates 
m'. To see this, note that the outcome only changes in D8A, i is strictly better off when 
m1 = (x, s, s', - 2, k' + 1, s) Vj * i, and i is no worse off anywhere else. Q.E.D. 
Lemmas 1-2 show F(s) c UNE(s), Lemmas 3-5 show UNE(s) cF(s), so F(s) = UNE(s) Vs. 
Finally, we indicate how the mechanism has to be modified when some or all agents have no or 
worst elements at some states. If agent i has no worst element, the outcomes in the various regions 
have to be changed as follows: in D3 and D9s to something strictly worse for i at s than x; in D5A 
and D?A to something strictly worse for i at s" than both y1(s, s") and yz(s, s"); in DsA> w'(s") 
should be replaced by x if i * i 1(s, s") and z2(s, s") if i = iz(ss"). Q.E.D. 
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